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Abstract—From a security standpoint, VANETs (Vehicular ad
hoc Networks) are vulnerable to attacks by malicious users,
due to the decentralized and open nature of the wireless system.
For many of these kinds of attacks detection is unfeasible, thus
making it hard to produce security. Despite their characteriza-
tion as dynamically reconfigurable networks, it is nonetheless
essential to identify topology and population properties that
can optimise mitigation protocols’ deployment. In this paper,
we provide an algorithmic definition and simulation of a trust
and mitigation based protocol to contain a Black Hole style
attack on a VANET. We experimentally show its optimal
working conditions: total connectivity, followed by a random
network; connection to external networks; early deployment of
the protocol and ranking of the message. We compare results
with those of existing protocols and future work shall focus on
repeated broadcasting, opportunistic message forwarding and
testing on real data.
1. Introduction
MANET (Mobile Ad hoc Network) refers to a self-
configuring system of mobile routers, with wireless links
to form an arbitrary topology. The mobility of the routers
are provided randomly and organized arbitrarily. VANET
(Vehicular Ad hoc Network) is the application of MANET
structures to vehicles and roadside unit networks created
to enhance transportation systems through vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications.
This kind of systems has various potential applications [10],
[21]. From a security standpoint, any MANET is highly
vulnerable to attacks by malicious users and security of data
transmission is the main concern. Due to their distributed
and dynamic nature, such networks are open to several types
of threats, including false message propagation. For many
of these kinds of attacks, detection is unfeasible, making it
hard to produce security. Trust and reputation are among the
most used concepts to ensure integrity, reliability and safety
of services. While an increasing literature is available on
mitigation protocols for such attacks, the focus on dynamic,
reconfigurable networks tends to make these results opaque
with respect to conditions of the network when the attack
takes place. It is nonetheless essential to identify topology
and population properties that can optimise mitigation pro-
tocols’ deployment on VANETs.
The present paper simulates a type of attacks on a
VANET and deploys a trust and reputation model to mit-
igate it presented in [17]. Our main aim is to investigate
whether this protocol is effective in preventing such type
of attacks under precise and well specified conditions. The
algorithms that constitute the backbone of the implemen-
tation are presented as pseudo-code below (see Figures
1,3,5,6), and the code of our simulation is made available at
https://github.com/gprimiero/trust4vanet2 for reproducibility
purposes, together with all data from our experiments.
Contrary to many contributions in the area, we make use
of standard network theory analysis to investigate which
network properties (like size and topology), which popula-
tion properties (like proportion of the attackers) and which
contextual conditions (like the current content distribution)
are optimal to constraint the attack. This allows to set
some clear benchmarks for the specific type of attack we
consider; moreover, it makes the model general enough to
be easily reconfigured for V2I scenarios. The rest of the
paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we overview
first the types of attacks on mobile networks defined in the
literature and some of the current protocols deployed for
their mitigation; in Section 3 we illustrate informally the
kind of attack object of our analysis and in Section 4 we
provide an algorithmic description in pseudo-code of our
trust and reputation-based mitigation protocol; in Section 5
we present our experimental results, offer some comparisons
with existing data and highlight advantages and limitations
of our approach; finally, in Section 6 we briefly present
further steps of this research.
2. Related Work
Due to their particular architecture, ad-hoc networks are
more easily attacked than wired networks. Two main kinds
of attacks are usually distinguished [11, p.956]:
• passive attacks: they do not disrupt the operation of
the protocol, but try to discover valuable information
by listening to traffic;
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• active attacks: they inject arbitrary packets and try to
disrupt the operation of the protocol in order to limit
availability, gain authentication, or attract packets
destined to other nodes.
We focus below on active attacks. The most common type,
performed due to their easiness, are “Attacks Using Modifi-
cation”: a malicious node disturbs the good operation of an
ad-hoc network by announcing better routes (to reach other
nodes or just a specific one) than the other nodes. This kind
of attack is based on the modification of the metric value for
a route, or executed by altering control message fields [11,
p.956]. In “Attacks using Impersonation” (spoofing), the
malicious node hides its real IP address or MAC address
and uses another one. As current ad-hoc routing protocols
like AODV and DSR do not authenticate source IP address,
a malicious node can launch many attacks by using spoofing.
For example, a hacker can create loops in the network to
isolate a node from the remainder of the network. To do
this, the hacker just has to take the IP address of another
node in the network and then use it to announce a new
route (with the smallest metric) to the others nodes. By
doing this, he can easily modify the network topology as he
wants [11, p.956]. Attacks by “Resource Overuse” indicate
the additional use of a resource by a node for any activity
other than route finding and maintaining or transmitting
data. As mobile nodes may have limited resources in terms
of memory, storage, processing power, and battery life, if an
IDS involves too much data and computations, then there
will be more usage of memory and processing power, thus
disrupting the normal functioning of the network [9, p.388].
Several attack strategies can be identified [5, p.345]:
• Black hole Attack: in this type of attack, malicious
nodes broadcast the message to all the nodes, divert-
ing all the traffic toward themselves, and without
forwarding the data packets to the neighbouring
nodes, so that all the (non-malicious) data packets
are dropped;
• Gray hole Attack: in this form of Black hole
attack, the malicious nodes drop the data packets
for particular nodes for particular period of time in
the network. Gray hole attacks are more difficult to
identify as compared to black hole attacks;
• Wormhole Attack: in this type of attack, two ma-
licious nodes from a tunnel and all the data packets
received at one location of the network are tunneled
to the other location, in such a way that all the data
are resent to the network. The tunnel between two
malicious nodes is called a Wormhole. Such attacks
prevent any route other than through the wormhole
from being discovered;
• Byzantine Attack: this type of attack is carried
out by intermediate nodes or group of intermediate
nodes. Such malicious nodes provide the false rout-
ing information and create routing loops as well as
forward their data packets to that path which is not
optimal and which may be harmful to the system;
• Denial of Service Attack: it prevents the victim
from using all or part of the network connections.
DOS attack may have numerous forms and are hard
to detect. In this type of attack, attacker nodes send
the excessive amount of data packets or requests to
the server so the latter gets busy in testing illegal
request and will not be available to other. This attack
may degrade the performance of the network since
it consumes the energy (Battery Power) of nodes.
Black hole detection has been an active area of research
since the ‘next hop information’ based scheme was proposed
in 2002 [6], with a few among the proposed solutions
focusing on collaborative black holes. Among the most
sophisticated mitigation protocols is the ‘Fidelity Table’
method [20]. In this model, every participating node is
allotted a particular fidelity level, a measure of reliability.
Whenever a source node broadcasts a RREQ (Route Re-
quest) and holds up, the incoming RREPs (Route Reply)
are gathered in its Response Table. If the average of the
fidelity level of RREP sending node (RREPN) and its next
hop node (NHN) in the route is found to be over a predeter-
mined threshold, the RREPN (Route Reply Sending Node)
is considered as trustworthy. Therefore, on the receipt of
multiple RREPNs, the one with the highest fidelity level is
selected. However, if multiple nodes have the same fidelity
level, the RREPN with the minimal hop count is chosen.
Finally, routing is accomplished via the selected path. Upon
data receipt, the destination node sends an acknowledgement
to the source node within timer. Next, fidelity level of the
RREPN is incremented as an accolade for honest routing
else that of both RREPN and its NHN is decremented for
being collaborative. If fidelity level of a node drops to zero,
it is considered as a black hole and the presence of attack
is intimated to all using alarm packets. Despite the fact
that this method handles both single and collaborative black
hole attacks, it involves increased storage overhead, routing
overhead, computational overhead and delay. This is because
each node should maintain a Fidelity Table and a Response
Table that must be updated and exchanged among the nodes
periodically [19]. Reputation is a crucial notion in several
other protocols, and used in ours as well.
Reputation is complemented by trust models in several
VANET models, defined in accordance to their main object:
entity-centric [13], [8], data-centric [18], [12] and combined
[23]. An overview of the issues related to trust in fixed and
mobile ad hoc networks is given in [24], while approaches
for trustworthiness and reputation in ad hoc mobile networks
are presented, for example, in [7], [4]. The work in [22]
offers an analysis that accounts for reputation as a char-
acteristic of message forwarding among vehicles, drivers
and other agents: reputation of these agents is based on
a descriptive ontology and is used to provide feedback in
the system. In [17], we have provided a logic calculus that
formally verifies this reputation model by adding a trust
function in order to guarantee absence of unsafe behaviours.
An interesting way to test the reliability of the model is to
simulate an attack, which is the main aim of the present
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to discovery [ propositionIndex # turtles ]
ask n−of # turtles turtles [ knowProposition propositionIndex −1 1 ]
end
Figure 1. Discovery
contribution.
3. The Attack Scenario
In view of the taxonomy of attacks on mobile networks
presented above, we restrict our current attention specifically
to a Black Hole type of attack in which one or more
nodes block the transmission of truthful information and
start distributing manipulated data. For the present purposes,
it is irrelevant the content or dimension of this data and we
just represent it by atomic formulas and their negation: an
advanced modeling of the present protocol will focus on the
use of real data.
At any point in time in which the attack is deployed,
the network can be assumed to have a specific topological
configuration produced by the actual set of active communi-
cations among its nodes (see Section 4.1 for the topologies
analysed in the present work). A first aim of the present
work is to establish which topological structure should the
agent have at the moment of the attack (or immediately
after) in order to maximally constrain it.
Agents (vehicles) are categorised according to one of
three families (or breeds, the labels used are ours, but they
reflect standard typologies of agents in similar scenarios):
• discoverers: one or more agents in possession of
truthful and updated data, possibly received by an
external network through Internet or a RSU;
• attackers: one or more agents performing the attack,
by flipping the truth value of data to be distributed
in the network;
• receivers: the remaining set of vehicles, which have
no information, or with information requiring an
update.
Discoverers generate truthful information by assigning truth-
value 1 to a proposition which describe some content of rel-
evance to the network (e.g. “temperature < 5c”), according
to the routine defined in Figure 1.
Message passing is performed by the routine in Figure
2. It requires every agent with a message whose truth value
is non-neutral (i.e. equal to either 1 or 0) to pass it to one of
its neighbors. Note that currently we do not implement the
opportunistic forwarding protocol described in [22], which
requires to select the recipient with the highest reputation
value.
By definition, this routine holds for both discoverers and
attackers. When an attacker receives truthful information p
(labeled by truth-value 1) on the current outside temperature
and road conditions in view of ice and snow, its aim is to
flood the network with its negation (labeled by truth-vale 0),
and to get as many vehicles as possible to distribute it. We
to spreadKnowledge [ propositionIndex ]
ask turtles with [ item propositionIndex propositions != 0 ]
[
let myId who
let truthVal item propositionIndex propositions
ask one−of link−neighbors
[ knowProposition propositionIndex myId truthVal ]
]
end
Figure 2. Message Passing
to attack [ propositionIndex ]
ask n−of number attacker turtles with
[ item propositionIndex propositions = 1 ]
[
set breed attackers
knowProposition propositionIndex −2 −1
]
end
Figure 3. Attack
implement the attack through the routine defined in Figure
3.
If no protocol is in place to resolve conflicting informa-
tion transmission, the attack might easily succeed. This is
clearly shown by the initial experimental results in Section
5. If a simple majority protocol is used to discern between
conflicting data, it might be enough for the attacker to target
a limited number of nodes with high degree of connectivity,
in order to flood the entire network. Trust and reputation are
crucial to improve on simple quorum protocols.
Several of the work presented in Section 2, introducing
trust and reputation methods for VANET attacks, presents
such attacks under the general assumption that the network
is dynamic and therefore no topological analysis is usually
done. As a negative effect, this means that results are
usually under-specified with respect to which are the initial
conditions (topological, temporal, etc.) of the attack. We
investigate the preferred topological structure of the network
in the aftermath of an attack in order to limit its efficacy. In
particular, our parameters concern:
1) the topology of the network at the moment of the
attack;
2) the proportion of discoverers and attackers;
3) the ranking of truthful information object of the
attack;
4) the state of truthful information diffusion at the
moment of the attack.
4. The Trust and Reputation Model
In the present section we provide a high-level description
of our trust and reputation based model, deployed to mitigate
Black-Hole attacks on mobile networks. This protocol is
based on the logic (un)SecureND, a natural deduction cal-
culus introduced in [16] to define trust, mistrust and distrust
protocols and extended in [15] with a negation connective.
In [17] a modified version has been presented, adapted for
a VANET network with the introduction of a reputation
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to−report calculateApperceptionValue
[ sourceRanking propositionRanking tick ]
report (1.0∗sourceRanking)∗(1.0∗ propositionRanking)∗( tick∗1.0)
end
Figure 4. Apperception
measure. This last version is implemented in NetLogo in
this work for the purpose of experimental analysis.
Given A a set of agents containing vehicles V and
roadside units (RSUs) R, an order ≺ holds between agents
and expresses a reputation order. S denotes a set of services
for the messages, with C a set of service characteristics, and
each element CSi−→n denoting the set of n characteristics of
service Si. In general, characteristics CSi−→n of services for
each service Si are associated with an order ≤ used to
order messages, and for two characteristics CSi−→n , C
Sj−→n , i = j,
there is no order between them. In the present experimental
analysis, we limit ourselves to a single message p about a
given service with one characteristic. The analysis of the
model generalised to multiple messages concerning several
characteristics for one service is left to future research.
In the implementation, we translate an order relation
pi < pj between messages as a fixed absolute ranking value
of a unique message p (rank p), which we will assume
is shared by all vehicles in each messaging instance, and
can assume three distinct numerical values corresponding to
low, medium and high relevance. As a further simplification,
we assume atomic messages, although the underlying logic
(un)SecureND allows for closure under connectives. For any
given message p received from another agent (either vehicle
or RSU), a vehicle will collect all the formulas that follow
from accepting it. This is called the Feedback Set of an
agent with respect to a message. In view of the mentioned
simplification, our Feedback Set is always a singleton. The
vehicle assigns a value to this atomic formula, using three
parameters:
1) a fixed ranking of the source, generated in this
model automatically by the topology of the network
(see below Section 4.1 for more details);
2) a ranking of the message, fixed at some low,
medium or high value for each messaging oper-
ation;
3) the time at which the reception of the message
occurs, computed by the clock underlying the sim-
ulation (the later the message arrives, the more
updated it is considered, the highest its value).
We call the resulting value Apperception, see Figure
4. As a result of working with atomic messages only, the
Apperception of a vehicle for a message is computed by
unary factors. Using this value, we define directly the order
of reputation for agents, which establishes a higher position
for the vehicle whose apperception is greater.
4.1. Network Construction
As mentioned, the original model which inspires the
present implementation and presented in [22] uses reputation
to define a recipient selection protocol: after vi broadcasts
a ‘hello’ message, if both vk, vj receive and accept the
message, then vi has to select a recipient on the basis of
the reputation order between vk and vj . Accordingly, a new
profile is built out of vi and the higher of the two recipients,
thus modeling a communication channel.
In the present implementation, given fixed network
topologies we assign an agent ranking on their basis. Rep-
utation then is defined by this factor together with message
ranking and timing, as explained above. In particular, we
consider the three following main topologies and associated
agent ranking methods:
• small-world: the network is generated according to
a power-law, by which each new node has a higher
probability to be linked to a node with high in-degree
than to one with low in-degree; in this topology,
higher in-degree nodes have higher ranking;
• total: every node is connected to any other node, and
all have the same ranking;
• random: edges are randomly distributed, and so is
the ranking which reflects the in-degree of each
node.
The advantage of fixing the networks and of determining the
agent ranking on that basis is to experimentally evaluate the
optimal topological conditions for the mitigation protocol.
A next step of this protocol evaluation will implement
reputation (based on message ranking and timing only) as
a criterion for recipient selection.
4.2. Message Passing Protocol
The trust protocol from the logic (un)SecureND en-
forces a consistency check on message passing. Each valid
vehicle profile meets all the requirements and conflicts
clauses of all service messages that the vehicle receives.
Trust allows to select valid messages among those that are
read: if a message is received by a vehicle and it preserves
its profile consistency, then it can be trusted. A message
readable and trusted by a vehicle can be further broadcast to
other vehicles. Mistrust is the protocol acting on conflicting
messages: a currently held message conflicting with a newly
arrived message is removed from the current vehicle profile
and none of its consequences are included; any message
consistent with the conflict resolution is trusted by removal
of the mistrusted message in the vehicle profile, including
any required dependency.
In the present implementation, message passing with
consistent information or when the receiving agent is an
attacker is unproblematic: it induces respectively acceptance
and rejection of the new message (in the latter case, it
means an attacker once flipped the value of a received
message will no longer change it). Message passing consis-
tent information to an agent who has no prior information
induces a reputation control: information is accepted when
coming from a source with higher reputation, while the
receiver remains undecided if information comes from a
source with lower reputation. A conflict is generated by two
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to−report verifyProposition
[ currentVal newVal propositionIndex breed currentWho sourceWho]
if ( breed = attackers )
[ report currentVal ]
if ( currentVal = newVal)
[ report newVal ]
if ( currentVal = 0)
[ ifelse (sourceApperception >= currentApperception)[ report newVal ]
[ report 0 ]
]
if ( currentVal ! = newVal)
[ ifelse (sourceApperception >= currentApperception)
[ let consensus
neighborConsensus propositionIndex newVal sourceApperception
ifelse (consensus = false ) [ report currentVal ]
[ report newVal ]
]
[ report currentVal ]
]
Figure 5. Trust
to−report neighborConsensus
[ propositionIndex truthVal sourceApperception ]
let total neighbors with opinion count link−neighbors with
[item propositionIndex propositions != 0
and item propositionIndex apperception > sourceApperception]
let total neighbors with same opinion count link−neighbors with
[item propositionIndex propositions = truthVal
and item propositionIndex apperception > sourceApperception ]
if ( total neighbors with opinion = 0) [ report false ]
report total neighbors with opinion = total neighbors with same opinion
end
Figure 6. Consensus
contradictory messages, and the profile is valid when such
conflicts are avoided. Receiving contradictory information
requires again reputation checking: with a source that has
reputation at least as high as the receiver, the latter checks
with any linked agent with higher reputation than the source;
when these show consensus (see Figure 6) with the receiver
about its currently held information, the latter does not
change its mind, and it does otherwise. See Figure 5.
5. Experimental Results
The model presented above has been implemented in
NetLogo for experimental validation and analysis. With this
aim, our focus has been on the following parameters:
1) network topology: we investigate the optimal topol-
ogy among small-world, total and random networks
for the minimization of the effects of the attack;
2) network size: we consider three main values on
this parameter, with networks of 10, 50, 100 nodes;
these sizes are only indicative of small, medium
and large networks, and analysis on sizes lower
than 10 and greater than 100 agents have shown no
statistically significant differences in the results;
3) message ranking: a static value at each message
passing operation, valid for all agents (both dis-
coverers and attackers), investigated with three dif-
ferent values 0.20, 0.50, 0.80 corresponding respec-
tively to low,medium,high ranking;
4) proportion of discoverers: proportion of agents with
truthful information at the beginning of the proto-
col, investigated with three values 10%, 50%, 90%;
we use these values as indicative of networks with
respectively a low, medium and high level of exter-
nal connectivity (e.g. through road-side unit con-
nected to the Internet);
5) proportion of attackers: proportion of agents per-
forming an attack, investigated with two values
1%, 10%; these values are experimentally shown
to be the lower and higher bound required for opti-
mization: with the lower bound we have a minimum
of 1 attacker, which is a standard configuration in
several other experimental analyses; with the higher
bound we establish that our protocol guarantees that
results do not get worse when more than 10% of
the population works as an attacker;
6) network coverage for attack: coverage of the en-
tire network with truthful information when the
attack is executed, investigated with three val-
ues 20%, 50%, 80% corresponding respectively to
low,medium,high coverage (reflecting an early,
intermediate and late attack).
Note that given the above configurations, our best scenario
will present 1% of attackers and 90% of discoverers, while
the worst one will have 10% for both categories of agents:
we stress here that experiments on intermediate configura-
tions fall in the appropriate range thus confirming these to
be the most interesting cases.
All experiments reported below have been executed on
a machine with 7.7 GB of memory, 64bit Ubuntu 17.10
system, NetLogo 6.0. Each configuration has been run for
a minimum of 100 times, and for several configurations we
have run 10 repetitions of 100 runs each. The results report
the median values of all runs.
5.1. First Configuration: Topology and Size
In the first set of experiments, we focus on determining
optimal topology and size for our mitigation protocol. We
investigate all sizes and topologies while keeping message
ranking and network coverage parameters both at a mini-
mum level (respectively 0.20 and 20%).
Our first experiment is executed with a proportion of
attackers and of discoverers both fixed at 10%, i.e. with
respectively 1, 5, 10 attackers/discoverers on networks of
10, 50, 100 nodes. In this way we also replicate attacks
performed by a single and by multiple agents. Results
are plotted in Figure 7: it clearly illustrates how under
these conditions the attack is highly successful and the
protocol has limited efficacy. The plotted lines reflect the
three topologies: under these attack conditions, the infection
remains high over all three and across all sizes.
These values of infection spread tend to decrease sensi-
bly when varying the proportion between attackers and dis-
coverers, in a way which preserves in general the optimality
of the topologies. By fixing the proportion of attackers at
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Figure 7. Experiment 1: Attack with 10% attackers/discoverers.
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Figure 8. Experiment 2: Attack with 1% attackers and 90% discoverers.
1% (in general, this means we are constraining the analysis
to a single attacker scenario) and increasing the proportion
of discoverers to 90% (such increase should be understood
as a large majority of the network being connected to an
external information source, like RSUs), the protocol makes
the network a lot more resilient to the attack, see Figure
8. These results shows an immediate sensible dropping of
the infection values, with total networks being the best
performing, followed by random and small-world ones, and
with larger networks being less prone to infection than
smaller ones.
Performed – but not reported here – experiments cover
several in-between configurations: in general, networks of
size < 10 nodes do not offer improvements and networks
of size > 100 do not present worse results, confirming our to
be maximally and minimally optimal configurations relative
to size and attackers/discoverers proportions.
These initial findings show that, while there is a posi-
tive effect intrinsically generated by the network size (the
greater the network, the harder to spread the attack), it is
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Figure 9. Experiment 3: Attack with 10% attackers/discoverers and 0.5
message ranking.
sufficient for the attackers breed to cover 10% of the entire
population in order to nullify such advantage. On the other
hand, with a single attacker, size sensibly helps reducing
the infection, with a totally connected network presenting
the most advantageous setting for the mitigation protocol,
followed by random and small-world. This suggests that in a
dynamically reconfigurable network, if an attack is identified
or suspected, total connectivity should be sought by the
agents (vehicles and RSU) in order to minimize its negative
effects.
5.2. Second Configuration: Message Ranking
The second set of experiments focuses on the variable
rankp, a numerical value to express a ranking of the
message: the higher this value, the more relevant is the
message considered by the network. We investigate the
above mentioned three values: 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 to express low,
medium and high relevance. The experiments are meant to
show how such ranking affects the ability of the protocol to
constraint the attack. Rising the value of rankp from 0.2
to 0.5 in the setting of the first experiment (Figure 7) has an
immediate positive effect, bringing a drastic improvement in
small networks of 10 nodes, and a significant one also in
larger configurations, see Figure 9. Further rising the value
of rankp to 0.8 does not improve these results.
On the other hand, analysing small-world, total and
random networks with a single attacker and a proportion
of 90% discoverers (i.e. the configuration of Experiment 2
in Figure 8), rising message ranking has no influence in
further reducing the infection in all topologies: the results
confirm the difference between the three topologies reflected
by Experiment 2, with total network showing the least
infection, an average of 50% less than in random networks,
which in turn on average is almost 60% better than small-
world networks. These results suggest that reputation is
only partially influenced by the relevance of the message,
as this obviously is computed for both discoverers and
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Figure 10. Experiment 4: Attack with 10% attackers/discoverers and 0.8
network coverage.
attackers. Future experiments should focus on the difference
to this factor provided by messages concerning different
characteristics within the same service.
5.3. Third Configuration: Network Coverage
The third set of experiments focuses on the variable
network coverage, a numerical value to express how
much of the overall network is informed of the correct
message when the attack is struck: the lower this value,
the less the network is correctly informed when the attack
begins. We investigate the above mentioned three values:
0.2, 0.5, 0.8 to express low, medium and high coverage. Our
aim is to investigate how the infection is effected when
parametrised by the relation between the attack being struck
and a percentage of the network having already received
truthful data. We show in Figure 10 the results for the setting
of the first experiment (Figure 7) modified by rising the
value of network_coverage from 0.2 to 0.8: in this
setting a drastic improvement in small networks of 10 nodes
is obtained, with all topologies managing to constrain the
infection to a maximum of 25%; in larger configurations
this level is maintained, except for small-world networks
presenting a pick of over 50% infection with size of 100
nodes. In general this means that a large fraction of the net-
work truthfully informed is essential to constrain infection.
Note that, again, analysing small-world, total and ran-
dom networks with a single attacker and a proportion
of 90% discoverers (i.e. the configuration of Experiment
2 in Figure 8), while rising the level of the variable
network_coverage from 0.2 to 0.8, no significant im-
provement in the results is obtained. The difference between
the three topologies remain invariant, with on average total
networks showing 50% less infection than random and these
50% less than small-world (these differences are slightly
less for small networks of 10 nodes). These results sug-
gest that damage limitation after an attack of the present
type requires an elevated number of nodes connected to an
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
%
 In
fe
ct
io
n
Network Size
SW Total Random
Figure 11. Experiment 5: Attack with 10% attackers/discoverers, 0.5
message ranking and 0.8 network coverage.
external network, to facilitate the increase of agents with
updated information at any point.
5.4. Fourth Configuration: Combined Optimal Pa-
rameters
In the last set of experiments, we combine the optimal
message ranking and network coverage parameters. We first
observe this combination in the non-optimal setting of ex-
periment 1 (Figure 7), i.e. with a proportion of attackers and
of discoverers both fixed at 10% on networks of 10, 50, 100
nodes. The results are plotted in Figure 11: this configuration
manages to keep the infection below 25% in the largest
networks and presents an average decrease in infection of
over 75% across the three topologies, when compared with
the worst-case scenario of experiment 1.
Finally we consider how the optimal configuration of
message ranking and network coverages affects the results of
Experiment 2 (Figure 8), where the proportion of attackers
is minimised to 1% and that of discovered maximised to
90%. Results shown in Figure 12 illustrate how the protocol
is able to minimise the negative impact of an attack by a
single agent on networks with a large proportion of agents
who transmit the truthful data if messaging ranking and
network coverage are optimised. The average improvement
on the result on the same networks without these last two
parameters optimised is of almost 30% across all topologies.
5.5. Summary of Results, Comparisons and Limi-
tations
Our experimental results can be summarised as follows:
• the reputation protocol is essential in constraining
the attack on networks of any size with at least 10%
of the population acting as attackers, presenting an
improvement of up to 80% on the same conditions
without reputation;
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Figure 12. Experiment 6: Attack with 1% attackers, 90% discoverers, 0.5
message ranking and 0.8 network coverage.
• the protocol is up to 90% more efficient in a one-
attacker condition when compared to attacks exe-
cuted by up to 10 malicious agents;
• total networks are overall the most efficient topology
for attack mitigation, with results up to 15% better
than in random and 30% better than in small-world
networks;
• network size is relevant only when reputation takes
into account a higher ranking for the message: then
the difference between infection in a 10 nodes net-
work and in a 100 nodes one can reach up to 30%.
These initial results suggest that the optimal deployment
strategy for the present mitigation protocol requires that:
1) agents seek total connectivity, and while this is an
unlikely configuration in a real-world scenario, a
random distribution of edges performs better than
a power-law distribution and it is sufficiently close
to the optimal topology;
2) the protocol is deployed as soon as possible, hence
ideally from the start of the messaging operation
rather than as a reaction to the attack, so that the
number of agents with correct information is as
high as possible when the attack occurs;
3) the network is as much as possible (in terms of
number of agents) connected to external informa-
tion sources.
Other positive aspects of the protocol are that its results are
not affected by either the size of the network, or by a number
of attackers greater than 10% of the entire population.
To offer some comparison with other protocols, in the
following we relate the infection spread contained by our
protocol with the packet delivery ratio in other protocols,
i.e. the ratio between the number of packets sent by the
sources and the number of packets received by the sink at
the final destination. The two values are obviously inversely
proportional, although the comparison is only partially sig-
nificant given the different topological structures and other
incomparable parameters. The first comparison is made with
the protocol from [20] on a 25 nodes network with 2 at-
tackers: results reported for PCBHA with random way point
model mobility, 100 items load and 5−8 transactions, give a
delivery ratio of 60%, an increase of around 90% compared
with the AODV protocol from [3]; the protocol based on
(un)SecureND with random network of 25 nodes, 2 attack-
ers and 23 discoverers (note the difference with the 100
packets load), 0.5 rankp and 0.8 network_coverage),
guarantees an average infection spread limited to 17% over
1000 simulation runs; considering the initial 8% infection
due to the attackers, the comparable delivery packet ratio
amounts to 91%.
We provide a second comparison with the results from
[2], where the protocol TCRSR on a 50 nodes network with
10% attackers is reported to guarantee up to 50% delivery ra-
tio when agents move at 10m/s speed; on the same network
size and with the same percentage of attackers, our protocol
with random network of 50 nodes, 5 attackers and 45
discoverers, 0.5 rankp and 0.8 network_coverage),
guarantees an average infection spread limited to 22% over
1000 simulation runs; considering the initial 10% infection
due to the attackers, the comparable delivery packet ratio
amounts to 88%.
It is also essential to stress some limitations of our
method. First of all, the high-level of abstraction proper
of our implementation does not allow to analyse low-level
properties, like packet size. Although possible, we have not
implemented other useful properties, like number of parallel
communications and communication distance (currently we
allow message passing by physical presence on the same
world’s patch, roughly corresponding to close contact of the
agents). Secondly, the current experiments are performed in
an idealised setting, where additional problems like physical
obstacles or weaknesses in the communication protocol are
not taken into account: only some physical implementation
could further enhance our results by taking these aspects
into account.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a simulated analysis of
a trust and reputation based protocol for the mitigation of
Black Hole type attacks in VANETs. The present imple-
mentation is simplified under several aspects, in particular:
messaging is a one-time event and is not repeated in short
time spans; message forwarding happens by random recip-
ient selection; messages are atomic. Notwithstanding this
specification, our analysis clearly shows a working protocol
which is especially efficient with total and random network,
if deployed early and with a large connectivity to external
information sources. Next steps of this research include: the
implementation of a lower level of abstraction in the proto-
col, repeated broadcasting and opportunistic forwarding; the
translation to a simulation environment that can help capture
such relevant properties, like OmNet++ or VSimRTI; testing
the protocol on real data, which will be made available
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thanks to the testbed deployed by colleagues at Middlesex
University [14].
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